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DISENTANGLING CONFLICTS OF





The European Union (èEUæ) is integrated into global markets via an open in-
vestment regime, which has fostered the development of wide economic relations.
In 2019, the net investment outflow from EUMember States toward third countries1
totaled $42,6761 million, while inflow totaled $47,3196 million.2 To regulate in-
vestment disparities since the establishment of the common market in the 1950s,
EU Member States have concluded about 1400 multilateral investment treaties
(èMITsæ) and bilateral investment treaties (èBITsæ) with third countries.3 EUMem-
ber States have also negotiated around 190 MITs and BITs inter se, or intra-EU
investment agreements.4 Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU
has negotiated international investment agreements with economies such as Aus-
tralia, Canada, China, Vietnam, Singapore, and the United States.5 Among these
agreements, the Energy Charter Treaty (èECTæ) is both an intra-EU and extra-EU
investment agreement,6 to which both the EU and Member States are parties. It is
therefore of critical importance to establish a predictable legal framework govern-
ing investments within and outside of the EU.
The European Commission and respondent EU Member States in international
litigation have several times supported the supremacy of EU law over EU Member
States’ investment agreements.7 This stance is based on Article 351 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU (èTFEUæ),8 which establishes an implicit primacy of
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1. äThird countries’ are countries that are not parties to the EU.
2. OECD, FDI in Figures 10 (2020).
3. These may also be referred to as äextra-EU investment agreements.’ They are made of agreements
between an EU Member State or States and a State or States that are not part of the EU.
4. EU Foreign Direct Investment Flows in 2018, EUROSTAT (July 17, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/eu-
rostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20190717-1. (Last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
5. See Negotiations and Agreements, EU, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-re-
gions/negotiations-and-agreements/ (Last updated Jan. 22, 2021).
6. Adopted December 17, 1994, in force April 16, 1998. The Energy Charter Treaty, United Nations,
Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
7. See, e.g., Charanne and Construction Investments (Neth. & Lux.) v. Spain, SCC V 062/2012 ¶ 208
(Jan. 21, 2016).
8. As amended by the Lisbon Treaty, opened for signature December 13, 2007, in force on December
1, 2009.
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the EU founding treaties over EU Member States’ investment agreements.9 A sim-
ilar interpretation applies under TFEU Article 218(11), which establishes the su-
premacy of the EU founding treaties over international investment agreements con-
cluded by the EU.10 This approach clashes with the generally accepted regulation
of international investment via bilateral and multilateral treaties. International arbi-
tral tribunals have opposed the primacy of EU law, arguing in favor of the suprem-
acy of international investment agreements.11 Many international investment agree-
ments imbed supremacy clauses, such as ECT Article 16.12
This Article explores the relationship between EU law and international invest-
ment agreements by examining the conflict of supremacies of both intra-EU and
extra-EU investment agreements. Whereas the supremacy of EU law in intra-EU
investment disputes as regulation of the internal market is more apparent, there is
also a conflict over the supremacy of law for external agreements. The discussion
in this Article unfolds based on key international principles and rules, particularly
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (èVCLTæ) and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations
or between International Organizations (èVCLTIOæ).13
This article proceeds in four parts. First, section II presents the different stances
of various stakeholders on the issue of whether EU law or investment agreements
concluded by the EU and its Member States should prevail in governing foreign
investment. Second, section III defines the scope of the conflict, by outlining a
hierarchy for the sources of EU law and contextualizing them within international
law. Third, section IV addresses the conflict of supremacies between priority
clauses under the EU founding treaties and intra-EU and extra-EU investment
agreements. Fourth, section V explores relevant implications of substantive priority
for adjudication and enforcement, which allows inferences on the validity of arbitral
tribunals under the current Investor-State Dispute Settlement (èISDSæ) system and
their decisions.
II. CONFLICTS OF LAWS
Problems of consistency for governing law in internal and external investment
agreements concern the most-favored-nation (èMFNæ) treatment, national treat-
ment (èNTæ), and fair and equitable treatment (èFETæ).14 The MFN entails that
State A must give a foreign investor from State B the most favorable treatment it
accords to foreign investors from State C.15 The NT compels a state not to
9. See PHILIP STRIK, SHAPING THE SINGLE EUROPEANMARKET IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT 21 (2014).
10. Id. at 215, 223.
11. Charanne & Construction Investments, SCC V 062/2012 at ¶ 430.
12. Supremacy rules resolve conflicts of laws by prioritizing a hierarchically superior rule. See
RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. & RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sàrl v. Kingdom of
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/20, Decision on Jurisdiction, June 6, 2016 ¶ 87 [hereinafter RREEF].
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and In-
ternational Organizations or between International Organizations,Mar. 21, 1986, A/CONF.129/15 [here-
inafter VCLTIO].
14. Teis Tonsgaard Andersen & Steffen Hindelang, The Day After: Alternatives to Intra-EU BITs, 17
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 984, 992-95 (2016).
15. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, U.N. Doc
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1 (2010).
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discriminate between foreign and domestic investors.16 The FET requires a state to
treat foreign investment according to a minimum standard of fairness and equity.17
An example concerning both NT and FET, is TFEU Articles 107 and 108, which
allow states to regulate, subsidize, or otherwise aid the internal market, but only if
duly approved by the European Commission. In Electrabel SA v. Hungary, an Ar-
bitral Tribunal established under the International Centre for the Settlement of In-
ternational Disputes (èICSIDæ) considered that state aid given without approval of
the European Commission is not a breach of a foreign investor’s legitimate expec-
tations.18 Another example concerning FET, is a situation where investor X in State
A invests in State B and recoups dividends, which under investment treaties are
usually freely transferable to State C. This situation is lawful under international
investment agreements, but according to the European Commission, it conflicts
with the power of EU institutions to restrict free transfers under TFEU Articles
65(1) and 215.19 A further example is BITs prohibiting indirectly discriminatory
taxation, where EU law only prohibits directly discriminatory taxation.20 Under
these circumstances, the question arises whether EU regulation should prevail or
the investment treaty, provided both are applicable, according to conflict of laws
rules.
A variety of opinions have been forwarded about what laws are supreme, sup-
porting either the primacy of EU law or that of investment agreements. For in-
stance, in Eastern Sugar BV v. Czech Republic, foreign investors in the Czech Re-
public claimed a breach of FET following new regulation on the sugar sector after
the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.21 The European Commission al-
leged that the then èCommunity law,æ including the founding treaties and secondary
legislation, prevailed over intra-EU investment agreements under Article 307 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community (èECæ),22which provided that èwhere
the EC Treaty or secondary legislation are in conflict with some of these BITs’
provisions–or should the EU adopt such rules in the future–Community law will
automatically prevail over the non-conforming BIT provisions.æ23 According to the
Commission, the application of intra-EU BITs could lead to a more favorable treat-
ment for investors in EU Member States covered by a BIT, thus discriminating
against investors from other Member States, contrary to the fundamental principles
governing the free movement of capital in the internal market.24 Despite the
16. Don Wallace, Jr. & David B. Bailey, The Inevitability of National Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow Exceptions, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 615 (1998).
17. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment Stand-
ard in International Investment Law, Working Papers on International Investment, 20004/03 (2004).
18. Electrabel SA v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision of Jurisdiction, Applicable Law
and Liability, ¶¶ 6.66-.69, 6.91 (Nov. 30, 2012).
19. Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA
Case No. 2008-13, ¶ 248; Letter from Margrethe Vestagar, Member of the European Commission, to




20. SD Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, ¶ 259 (Nov. 10, 2000).
21. Eastern Sugar B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, SCC No. 088/2004, ¶ 20 (Mar. 27,
2007).
22. Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ C 325, December 24, 2002, 33-184.
23. SECIL v. Fazenda Pública, C-464/14, ¶ 54 (Nov. 24, 2016).
24. Eastern Sugar B.V. (Neth.) at ¶ 119.
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affirmation of the èautomaticæ prevalence of EU law, the Commission invited EU
Member States to terminate intra-EU investment agreements.25 The Arbitral Tribu-
nal rejected the argument of the Commission that EU law prevails over investment
agreements, and thus affirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute.26
In Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, the claimants invoked a
breach of the FET standard by Spain for altering the regulatory framework existing
at the time of the investment, by passing new legislation between 2010 and 2013
which created a situation of instability, contrary to ECT Article 10(1).27 The claim-
ants argued that, by adopting RD 1565/2010 and RDL 14/2010,28 Spain had in-
fringed the legitimate expectations of investors under prior regulation.29 According
to Spain, as the respondent, EU law should have applied, rather than the ECT, to
resolve the dispute under TFEUArticle 351 (ex EC 307).30 Spain argued that èintra-
European investment relations are subject to the specific regulatory framework of
the EU, which thoroughly deals with all matters governed by investment treaties,
including those covered by the ECT,æ so that èthe ECT is not applicable to invest-
ments made within the EU by nationals of EU Member States and does not confer
any right to such nationals.æ31 Thus, the primacy of EU law would automatically
make EU investment agreements at least inapplicable,32 which was the position of
the European Commission acting as amicus curiae. However, relying on principles
of contract law and the agreement between the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal con-
sidered the ECT applicable to the dispute.33
In Electrabel, the Petitioner claimed in an ICSID Arbitral Tribunal that there
had been a breach of the FET standard under the ECT, based on the decision by
Hungary to terminate a power purchase contract.34 The European Commission de-
veloped a different argument compared to Eastern Sugar and Charanne, alleging
that ECT Article 16, which prioritizes the ECT over agreements that are less favor-
able to investors or investment, only applies to the extent that the ECT is compatible
with the Act of Accession to the EU and, therefore, with EU law.35 Under Article
2, EU Member States have excluded the application inter se of the conflict rule
embedded in ECT Article 16, thus prioritizing the general supremacy rule under EU
law.36 The arguments of the Commission found the support of the Arbitral Tribunal,
which concluded that not only did the EU founding treaties prevail but also EU law
generally when a material inconsistency arises.37 The Arbitral Tribunal noted that
25. Id.
26. Id. at ¶¶ 143-181.
27. Charanne & Construction Investments, supra note 7, at ¶ 80.
28. Real Decreto-ley 14/2010 establishedmeasures to correct a tax deficit in the electric sector, aiming
at increasing revenues from access to the electric grid in order to cover State expenses related to the
transport and distribution of energy.
29. Charanne & Construction Investments, SCC V 062/2012, at ¶ 80.
30. Id. at 222.
31. Id. at 208.
32. STRIK, supra note 9, at 213; August Reinisch, The EU on the Investment PathæQuo Vadis Europe?
The Future of EU BITs and Other Investment Agreements, 12 SANTACLARA J. INT’LL. 111, 150 (2013).
33. Charanne & Construction Investments, supra note 7, at 438.
34. Electrabel, ICSID ARB/07/19, Final Award (November 25, 2015), at 124.
35. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of
Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union,
May 1, 2004, 46 O.J. 236.
36. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, at ¶ 4.109.
37. Id. at ¶ 4.191.
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èthe pre-eminence of EU law applies not only to pre-accession treaties between EU
Members but also to post-accession treaties between EUMembers, as EUMembers
cannot derogate from EU rules as between themselves.æ38
Regarding extra-EU investment agreements, in 2006 the European Commis-
sion commenced infringement proceedings under EC Articles 10, 226, and 307
against Austria, Finland, and Sweden, among other countries.39 The action ad-
dressed the free transfer of investment-related payments under BITs entered into
with third States before accession to the EU, in breach of EC Articles 57(2), 59, and
60(1), which established temporary exceptions to free movement of capital under
the economic and monetary union. The European Court of Justice (èECJæ) upheld
the arguments of the Commission and held Austria, Finland, and Sweden obliged
to bring the BITs into conformity with EU law or to terminate them.40 After the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these views have been expanded in EU Reg-
ulation 1219/2012.41 The Regulation vests the Commission with the power to de-
termine whether a pre-Lisbon extra-EU BIT constitutes a èserious obstacleæ to the
negotiation of a BIT between the EU and third countries, envisioning a progressive
replacement (Articles 5-6).42 The Commission can also subordinate Member
States’ negotiations with third countries to the amendment of BIT clauses that are
inconsistent with EU investment policy, EU law, or EU negotiations (Articles 8-
9).43
This overview shows that there is widespread uncertainty as to what norms
should prevail. Scholars, politicians, and other professionals have advocated for
resolving issues of compatibility, arguing that the ètime has come for a clarification
on the issue.æ44 This is particularly relevant because an unpredictable legal frame-
work may have a chilling effect on investments.45 Essentially, two problems arise.
The first issue concerns the scope of the conflict between the supremacy of laws.
Some stakeholders advocate the supremacy of the EU founding treaties over inter-
national investment agreements, or vice versa, whereas others extend the conflict to
EU law more broadly. Second, the question arises concerning what regulation
should effectively prevail, whether the international or rather EU regulation con-
trols.
38. Id. at ¶ 4.186.
39. Case C-205/06, Commission v. Republic of Austria, 2009 O.J. (C 102) 2 (May 1, 2009); Case C-
249/06, Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2009 O.J. (C102) 2 (May 1, 2009); Case C-118/07, Com-
mission v. Finland, 2010 O.J. (C24) 3 (Jan. 30, 2010).
40. Case C-205/06, Commission v. Republic of Austria, 2009 O.J. (C 102) 2 (May 1, 2009); Case C-
249/06, Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2009 O.J. (C102) 2 (May 1, 2009); Case C-118/07, Com-
mission v. Finland, 2010 O.J. (C24) 3 (Jan. 30, 2010).
41. Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements Between Member
States and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 42.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 42-43.
44. Andersen & Hindelang, supra note 14, at 986.
45. Id. at 987-988.
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III. SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT
A. Sources of EU law
To clarify the relationship between EU regulation and intra-EU and extra-EU
investment agreements, it is necessary to adopt a paradigm to frame the sources of
EU law in a descending hierarchy.46
The EU has three sources of law. The primary sources of EU law are the found-
ing treaties, such as the Treaty on European Union (èTEUæ) and TFEU.47 After the
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, primary EU law also includes the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (èEUCFRæ).48 These are integrated by the general princi-
ples of EU law, which are inferred from fundamental domestic or international
rules.49 Secondary sources ground their validity in primary law and encompass acts
passed by EU institutions, notably regulations, directives, and decisions, which cre-
ate binding legal obligations. Conversely, other acts, recommendations, and reso-
lutions are not binding and thus cannot be considered sources of the law. These
sources are complemented by the third source, the acts passed by States implement-
ing EU acts, the validity of which is grounded in primary or secondary EU law.
The framework is completed by the international agreements of the Union, whereby
the EU founding treaties override international agreements concluded by the EU,50
whereas EU Member States’ agreements rank below secondary EU law.51 Mixed
agreements are considered hierarchically equivalent to conventions concluded by
the EU in matters where the Union has exclusive competence, but superior to EU
Member States’ treaties in matters of shared competence or exclusive Member
States’ competence.52
In practice, after the Lisbon Treaty, most extra-EU investment agreements are
to be concluded as mixed agreements,53 progressively replacing existing EU Mem-
ber States’ investment treaties, according to Regulation 1219/2012.54 In the
46. Roland Bieber & Isabelle Salomé, Hierarchy of Norms in European Law, 33 COMMONMKT. L.
REV. 909, 909 (1996).
47. PAULCRAIG&GRAINNEDEBÚRCA, EULAW: TEXTS, CASES ANDMATERIALS 142 (7th ed. 2020).
48. Treaty on European Union, art. 6(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 55 O.J. (C 326) 16 [hereinafter TEU].
49. European Parliament Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of
the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2009/2241(INI) (2010); PHILIPPE MANIN, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL DE
L’UE 473 (2004); TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THEGENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 4-5 (2013); GRAINNE&DE
BÚRCA, supra note 47, at 142-143.
50. Case C-61/94, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1996 E.C.R. I-03989, ¶ 52; STRIK,
supra note 9, at 159; Van Rossem, The EU at Crossroads: A Constitutional Inquiry into the Way Inter-
national Law Is Received within the EU Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEANUNION 58, 68 (Canizzaro, Palchetti & Wessel eds., 2011).
51. Van Rossem, supra note 50, at 76; Allan Rosas, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements
Concluded by EU Member States, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1304, 1314 (2011).
52. Eleftheria Neframi, Mixed Agreements as a Source of European Union Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS THE LAW OF THE EUROPEANUNION, 325, 348-349 (Canizzaro, Palchetti & Wessel eds., 2011).
53. European Parliament Resolution of 26 October 2017 Containing the Parliament’s Recommenda-
tion to the Council on the Proposed Negotiating Mandate for Trade Negotiations with Australia, EUR.
PARL. DOC. 2017/2192 (INI); 2015 O.J. (C 363) (May 16, 2017) (Accord de libre-échange 2/15); STRIK,
supra note 9, at 169.
54. Freja Baetens, Gerard Kreijen & Andrea Varga, Determining International Responsibility under
the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What Foreign Investors in the EU Should Know, 47 VAND.
J TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1217 (2014).
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meantime, EU Member States are voluntarily phasing out their intra-EU investment
treaties.55 On January 15, 2019, twenty-two EU Member States issued a Declara-
tion on Investment Protection in the EU,56 to the effect that European Union law
overrides BITs concluded between the Member States, including the ECT.57 None-
theless, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden, and Hungary believe that
all intra-EU BITs must be terminated on a bilateral or multilateral basis, save the
ECT.58 In fact, these States noted that the judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (èCJEUæ) in Slovak Republic v. Achmea, which posits the suprem-
acy of EU law over EU Member States’ investment agreements, is silent on the
ECT.59 On May 12, 2020, the majority of the EU Member States signed an agree-
ment to terminate bilateral intra-EU BITs,60 with the exclusion of Austria, Ireland,
Finland, and Sweden.
Schematically, a framework to systematize the sources of EU law and its rela-
tionship to Member States’ law includes:
1) TEU, TFEU, EUCFR and general principles of EU law (primary EU law);
2) EU international treaties;
3) EU regulations, directives and decisions (secondary EU law);
4) EU Member States’ international treaties; and
5) EU Member State’s legislation.
Such a hierarchy is perfectly viable from the internal standpoint of EU law, as
stated by the Arbitral Tribunal in RREEF Infrastructure, where, adjudicating upon
state energy reforms affecting the renewables sector, it was considered that the EU
is internally free to define an internal hierarchy.61 The ECJ and CJEU have sup-
ported the primacy of EU law.62 In principle, according to a èneo-monisticæ ap-
proach,63 all these sources have a direct or indirect vertical and horizontal effect
within EU Member States, which means that they produce not only vertical obliga-
tions between EU Member States and other legal persons, but also horizontal obli-
gations between legal persons within such States.64 This is subject to the criteria of
clarity and non-conditionality established by the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos.65
Therefore, where sufficiently clear and precise, international agreements concluded
by the EU and the Member States have direct application in EU Member States.66
55. Press Release, European Comm’n, Capital Markets Union: Comm’n Provides Guidance on Pro-
tection of Cross-border EU Invs., IP/18/4528 (July 19, 2018).
56. Press Release, European Comm’n, Declaration of the Representatives of the Gov’s of the Member
States, of 15 January 2019 on the Legal Consequences of the Judgement of the Court of J. in Achmea
and on Inv. Prot. in the European Union (Jan. 17, 2019).
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id. at 4; Press Release, Declaration of the Representative of the Gov’t of Hungary on the Legal
Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of J. in Achmea and on Inv. Prot. in the European Union
(Jan. 16, 2019).
59. Slovak Republic v. Achmea, C-284/16 (Mar. 6, 2018).
60. Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Inv. Treaties between the Member States of the Eur.
Union, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. UNION, OJ L169/1 (May 29, 2020).
61. RREEF Infrastructure, supra note 12, at ¶ 72.
62. Costa v. ENEL [1964] C 6/64 ECR 1141.
63. Enzo Canizzaro, The Neo-Monism of the Eur. Legal Order, INT’LL. ASL. OF THEEU35, 38 (Can-
izzaro, Palchetti & Wessel eds., 2011).
64. Beatrice Bonafe’, Direct Effect of Int’l Agreements in the EU Legal Order: Does It Depend on the
Existence of an Int’l Dispute Settlement Mechanism?, INT’L L. AS L. OF THE EU 229, 237 (2012).
65. Van Gend en Loos [1963] Case C-26/62 ECR 1, ¶ 76.
66. Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] 12/86 ECR 3719, ¶ 14; Merck Genericos–Produtos
Farmaceuticos v. Merck [2007] C-431-05 ECR I-7001. See also Pierre Pescatore, L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE
7
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Within this framework, TFEU Article 218(11) (ex EC 300) provides that, if the
CJEU gives a negative opinion as to whether an agreement concluded by the EU is
consistent with the EU founding treaties, èthe agreement envisaged may not enter
into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised.æ67 TFEU Article 216(2)
confirms that è[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institu-
tions of the Union and on its Member States.æ68
Regarding the relationship between the EU founding treaties and EU Member
States’ international treaties, TFEU Article 351 (ex EC 307) provides that è[t]he
rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or,
for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or moreMember
States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be
affected by the provisions of the Treaties.æ69 However, è[t]o the extent that such
agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States con-
cerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities estab-
lished.æ70
TFEU Articles 218(11) and 351 have given rise to different interpretations. An
ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, in Vattenfall v. Germany,71 held that not only TFEU Arti-
cle 218(11) but also TFEU Article 351, mentioning the necessity èto eliminate the
incompatibilities established,æ can be read as prioritizing international investment
agreements over the EU founding treaties, thus requiring a modification of the
founding treaties, rather than that of inconsistent international investment treaties.72
This approach is consistent with the stance of the EU Court of First Instance in Kadi
and Al Barakaat v. Council.73
However, TFEU Articles 218(11) and 351 establish the EU founding treaties
as lex superior to the Member States’ and the EU’s internal and external investment
agreements.74 Notably, TFEU Article 351 provides that the EU founding treaties do
not override investment agreements concluded by EU Member States with third
countries before the adoption of the EU founding treaties, or accession to such trea-
ties.75 Nonetheless, Member States must bring prior external investment
DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES: ETUDE DES SOURCES DU DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE 151 (1975);
Christina Eckes, Int’l Law as Law of the EU: The Role of the Court of J., in INT’L L. AS L. OF THE EU,
361, 360-61 (2010).
67. Information and Notices, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EU, Oct. 26, 2012, at 146.
68. Id. at 144.
69. Id. at 196.
70. Id.
71. Vattenfall v. Germany [2018] ICSID ARB/12/12, ¶ 228.
72. See also Pescatore, supra note 66, at 153 & 156; Jan Klabbers, The Validity of EU Norms Con-
flicting with Int’l Obligations, INT’L L. AS L. OF THE EU, 111, 120-21 (Canizzaro, Palchetti & Wessel
eds., 2011).
73. Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Comm’n, [2005] T-315/01 ECR II-3649, ¶¶ 213-32; Yusuf and
Al Barakaat v. Council & Comm’n [2005] T-306/01 ECR II-3533, ¶¶ 264-82. In these cases, the Court
of First Instance dealt with the validity of EC Council Regulation 881/2002, imposing restrictive
measures on suspect terrorists, in accordance with resolutions taken by the UN Security Council. The
ECJ held the Regulation valid, despite the fact that it implemented rights in breach of fundamental EU
principles.
74. Commission v. Italy [1962] C-10/61 ECR 1, ¶ 2; Annunziata Matteucci v. Communauté française
of Belgium and Others [1988] 235/87 ECR 5589, ¶ 22; Exportur SA v LOR SA and Others [1992] C-
3/91 ECR I-5529, ¶ 8. See also Strik, supra note 9, at 215 & 223.
75. OFFICIAL J. OF THE EU, supra note 67, at 196.
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agreements into conformity with the EU founding treaties.76 Along the lines of the
èunionizationæ of international law,77 this implies (a contrario) that the EU found-
ing treaties override external investment treaties concluded by EU Member States
with third countries after the adoption of or accession to the founding treaties.78
Furthermore, the EU founding treaties would implicitly (a contrario) override in-
vestment treaties concluded by EU Member States inter se, either before or after
the adoption of or accession to the founding treaties.79 Thus, in Kadi, the ECJ took
an anti-monistic stance diametrically opposed to the Court of First Instance80 and
upheld the primacy of the EU founding Treaties over international law.81
Nonetheless, the ECJ considered that former Article 234 of the treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community (èEECæ),82 now TFEU Article 351, does
not apply to treaties between EU Member States.83 Furthermore, according to the
ECJ, the prohibition under TFEU Article 351 cannot be extended to agreements
concluded by EU Member States with third countries after they accede to the EU.84
Concerning treaties concluded by the EU itself, scholars assume the necessary con-
sistency of international obligations of the Union contracted under the exercise of
exclusive competence, or mixed agreements in the case of shared competence, with
the EU founding treaties.85
As TFEU Articles 218(11) and 351 only refer to international agreements, it is
unclear what the relationship is between secondary EU law, EU Member States’
law, and international investment agreements.86 According to the CJEU, invest-
ment agreements concluded by the EU rank above secondary EU law.87 According
to a scholarly view, international investment agreements concluded by EU Member
States rank below national law.88 More precisely, this depends on whether a State
directly implements international norms within its legal order (monism) or requires
the adoption of national legislation to that effect (dualism). If an EU Member State
takes a monistic approach, its international investment agreements should prevail
over national law. Vice versa, if an EU Member State takes a dualistic approach,
national law should prevail over international investment agreements. However,
the non-implementation of an international investment agreement does not exclude
the international responsibility of an EU Member State under that convention.
76. Commission v. Republic of Austria, supra note 39, at ¶ 37; Case C-249/06, Commission v. King-
dom of Sweden, supra note 39, at ¶ 38; STRIK, supra note 9, at 155.
77. Van Rossem, supra note 50, at 68.
78. Comm’n v. Belgium & Luxembourg [1998] C-176 & 177/97 ECR I-3557; Procureur Général v.
Arbelaiz-Emazabel [1981] 181/80 ECR 2961, ¶ 31; STRIK, supra note 9, at 163.
79. STRIK, supra note 9, at 218-219. See also Vattenfall, supra note 71, ¶ 225.
80. Kadi, supra note 73, at ¶¶ 213-32; Yusuf & Al Barakaat v. Council of the Eur. Union [2005] Case
T-306/01 ECR II-3533, ¶¶ 264-82.
81. Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council & Comm’n [2008]
joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 ECR I-06351, ¶¶ 285-330.
82. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 7.
83. Community v. Italy, 1962 ECR 1.
84. Commission v. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1998 ECR I-03557.
85. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, ABC OF EU LAW 80 (EU 2010).
86. 2012 O.J. (C 326 145-146 and 195-196), November 26, 2012.
87. Germany v. Council, 1994 93 ECR 4973, ¶¶ 103-105 and 111; see also MANIN, supra note 49,
at 474; KPE LASOK&D. LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEANUNION, 132 (2001).
88. BORCHARDT, supra note 85, at 80.
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B. EU law and international law
In light of the èinternalæ EU legal framework, the starting point for disentan-
gling conflicts between EU law and other applicable law is determining which law
is applicable to an investment dispute, under èconflict of lawsæ rules.89 When, ac-
cording to the will of the parties or established international principles, such as lex
loci acti, lex domicilii, or lex fori,90 the law applicable to an international investment
dispute is domestic law, then several different scenarios arise. If the law applicable
to the controversy is that of a non-EU Member State, a conflict could arise during
enforcement in an EU Member State. If, conversely, the law of an EU Member
State applies to a foreign investment contract, the question is whether an interna-
tional investment agreement should apply to resolve the dispute and enforce the
decision, rather than EU law or the law of a Member State.91 More precisely, the
question is whether the international investment agreement should adapt to EU law
or vice versa.
Contrary to the stance of the European Commission,92 these questions must be
approached from the standpoint of èpublicæ international law, considering the con-
flict between international investment agreements and the EU founding treaties, ra-
ther than all the sources of EU law. There is a legal conflict for an EU Member
State that is a party to an investment agreement and the EU founding treaties.93
There is also a legal conflict for the EU when the Union is a party to an international
investment agreement, given that, while the Union has not ratified its founding trea-
ties, all its legislation is grounded in such treaties. These conflicts must be resolved
in light of the VCLT and VCLTIO, as stated by the Arbitral Tribunal in RREEF
Infrastructure.94 In other words, the conflict between an EU or Member State’s
international investment agreement and the EU founding treaties shifts the focus
from the internal system of the sources of EU law to the system of the sources of
international law. From the standpoint of èpublicæ international law, the èhierar-
chyæ is external to EU law and is as follows: EU Member States’ international (in-
vestment) treaties, including the TEU, TFEU, EUCFR, and EU international trea-
ties.
Since the EU remains an international organization,95 its founding treaties must
be coordinated with other international agreements. This is confirmed by the recent
adoption of the Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties.96
If the TEU and TFEU were superior to BITs concluded by EU Member States inter
se, a treaty aiming to terminate them would be unnecessary. Alternative approaches
èobstruct the proper functioning of international law,æ and, èseen from the angle of
89. Vives, Shaping the EU Investment Regime: Choice of Forum and Applicable Law in International
Investment Agreements, 6 CUADERNOS DEDERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 269, 279 (2014).
90. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, adopted June 19, 1980, 19
ILM 1492, in force April 1, 1991.
91. Vives, supra note 89, at 281 and 291; Pohl, Intra-EU Investment Arbitration after the Achmea
Case, 14 EUCONST L. REV. 767, 783-784 (2018).
92. See Section II above.
93. STRIK, supra note 9, at 163.
94. RREEF Infrastructure (GP) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sàrl v
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 75 (June 6, 2016).
95. Van Rossem, supra note 50, at 88.
96. Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between theMember States of the
European Union, 2020 O.J. (L 169/1).
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international law,æ are ènot always valid.æ97 Viewing the EU as a èconstitutionalæ
order in the absence of a formal constitution does not foster predictability.98 Claim-
ing that the EU legal system is autonomous under the idea of èpluralityæ echoes a
dualistic approach to international law.99 This means that by applying international
investment agreements rather than EU law to resolve an investment dispute, the
results affect the internal law of the EU Member States. In this respect, it is prob-
lematic to assume that èit is EU law itself that determines the status of international
agreements within it.æ100 The EU can take a dualistic approach to international in-
vestment agreements,101 but this is in breach of EU conventional obligations and
triggers the international responsibility of the Union. This approach is valid not
only for extra-EU investment treaties but also for intra-EU investment agreements
because there are international conventions that subject these agreements to general
principles of international law, particularly the VCLT and VCLTIO.
IV. RESOLVINGCONFLICTS: SUPREMACY AND COUNTER-SUPREMACY
To resolve a conflict between the EU founding treaties and international invest-
ment agreements concluded by the EU and its Member States, scholars have in-
voked VCLT and VCLTIO Article 30 (Application of Successive Treaties Relating
to the Same Subject Matter), Article 31 (Interpretation of Treaties), and Article 59
(Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty Implied by Conclusion of
a Later Treaty). However, Article 59 is inapplicable, to the extent that there is usu-
ally no such overlap and inconsistency to claim that either international investment
agreements intend to terminate the EU founding treaties or that, vice versa, the EU
founding treaties intend to terminate international investment agreements.102 In
fact, the EU requested that its Member States terminate intra-EU investment agree-
ments;103 this means that the EU founding treaties have not terminated or suspended
these conventions. Conversely, VCLT and VCLTIO Articles 30 and 31 are quite
pertinent.
VCLT and VCLTIO Article 31(3)(c) establish the principle of èsystemic inte-
gration,æ where treaties and international rules must be interpreted in accordance
with each other to a feasible extent. This is the prevailing rule to resolve conflicts
between international obligations, as it fundamentally excludes any possible con-
flict.104 Thus, the Arbitral Tribunal in RREEF Infrastructure supported the
97. Van Rossem, supra note 50, at 89.
98. On EU constitutionality, see Ramses Wessel, Monism, Dualism and the European Legal Orderæ
Reconsidering the Relationship between International and EU Law: Towards a Content-Based Ap-
proach?, INT’L L. AS THE L. OF THE EU 5, 24 (Canizzaro, Palchetti & Wessel eds., 2011).
99. Id. at 27; Van Rossem, supra note 50, at 62-64.
100. Christina Tietje & Clemens Wackernagel, Enforcement of Intra-EU ICSID Awards: Multilevel
Governance, Investment Tribunals and the Lost Opportunity of the Micula Arbitration, 16 JWIT 205,
209 (2015).
101. Eckes, supra note 66, at 360-61.
102. See, for instance, Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, Award of October 26, 2010, ¶¶ 233 and
239-244; August Reinisch, Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Action:
The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment Arbitrations, 39 LIEI 157,
168 (2012).
103. European Commission, supra note 53.
104. ILC, Report on Fragmentation of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), 25; See also Tarcisio
Gazzini, Bilateral Investment Treaties, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS
ANDOBLIGATIONS 99, 122 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds., 2012).
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harmonious interpretation of the EU founding treaties and international investment
agreements, whereby èto the extent possibleæ two treaties èequally, or unequally,
applicableæ must èbe interpreted so as not to contradict each other.æ105 According
to TFEU Article 207(3), which requires the EU Council and Commission to grant
that èthe agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and
rulesæ the Tribunal in Electrabel held that it would make èno sense for the EUæ to
become a Party to the ECT èif that had meant entering into obligations inconsistent
with EU law.æ106
When a harmonious interpretation is impossible, however, the chief principle
to resolve a conflict between international agreements is that of lex superior. Thus,
if an investment agreement concluded by the EU or a Member State does not in-
clude a supremacy clause, the EU founding treaties prevail under TFEU Articles
218(11) and 351 interpreted as supremacy clauses. Considering the sources of EU
law, this scenario presents two different options. For investment treaties concluded
by the EU, supremacy only extends to primary EU law, given that EU investment
agreements override secondary EU law.107 Concerning EU Member States’ invest-
ment agreements, the supremacy of EU law also extends to secondary EU law.
Conversely, if an investment agreement concluded by the EU orMember States
embeds a supremacy clause, a èconflict of supremaciesæ arises for the EU founding
treaties. This is exemplified by ECT Article 16 (Relation to Other Agreements),
which provides that, when a State is a party to both the ECT and other international
agreements, Parts III (Investment Promotion and Protection) and V (Dispute Settle-
ment) of the ECT override the norms of other international agreements covering the
same subject matter, to the extent that they are èmore favorable to the Investor or
Investment.æ108 This clause establishes the primacy of the treaty that is more favor-
able to an investor, which can be either an EU founding treaty or an investment
agreement concluded by the EU or Member States.
A conflict arises between TFEU Articles 281(11) and 354 and ECT Article 16.
As the Tribunal noted in RREEF Infrastructure, èEU law does not and cannot
ätrump’ public international law.æ109 VCLT Article 27 provides that a èparty may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty.æ110 It is possible to interpret the MFN treatment under ECT Article 16 as
a èdisconnection clauseæ prioritizing the ECT over the EU founding treaties, to the
extent that the ECT affords more favorable treatment to intra- and extra-EU inves-
tors.111 This is consistent with the fact that investment agreements are more favor-
able to foreign investors than the EU founding treaties.112 It is also worth noting
105. RREEF Infrastructure, supra note 12, at (GP) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure
Two Lux Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 76 (June 6,
2016).
106. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, at ¶ 4.133 (November 30, 2012).
107. STRIK, supra note 9, p. 219; Dimopoulos, The Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements
with EU Law, 39 LIEI 447, 451-452 (2012).
108. The International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty with Related Documents
art. 16, Jan 15, 2016, https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf.
109. RREEF Infrastructure, supra note 12, at ¶ 87. But see STRIK, supra note 9, at 218-20.
110. VCLT, supra note 13, at 339.
111. RREEF, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 60, 87; see alsoAES Summit Generation Ltd. and AES-Tisza Eromu
Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSD Case No. ARB/07/22, Award (Sep. 23, 2010), at ¶ 7.6.7.
112. Matthew Happold & Thomas Roe, The Energy Charter Treaty, in INT’L INV. L. 69, 72 (Tarcisio
Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds.,, 2012); Maylouda Sattorova, Inverstor Rights Under EU Law and
International Investment Law, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 895, 917 (2016).
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that, during the drafting of the ECT, the EU proposed a disconnection clause that
prioritized EU law, but the option was rejected.113
Concerning inter se relations between equal ranking subsequent treaties and
ensuing international rights and duties covering the same subject matter, in the ab-
sence of lex superior, two principles apply: lex specialis and lex posterior. The pre-
eminence of lex specialis over lex posterior has been recognized by the Interna-
tional Law Commission114 and confirmed by the Vattenfall Tribunal. è[T]he gen-
eral rule of lex posterior contained in Article 30 VCLT is a subsidiary oneæ and
èwhere a treaty includes specific provisions dealing with its relationship to other
treaties, such as appear in Article 16 ECT, the lex specialis will prevail.æ115 In this
respect, the Arbitral Tribunal in Marfin Investment Group Holdings and Others v.
Cyprus considered that the ECT and the EU founding treaties èdo not have the same
subject-matter.æ116 However, this stance is questionable, as there is significant over-
lap between these agreements regarding both market access and investment protec-
tion.117 Therefore, it is necessary to assess how VCLT and VCLTIO Article 30
regulate the relationship between such conventions.
According to the lex specialis principle, more specific treaties override (prior
or posterior) general conventions governing the same subject matter.118 In this re-
gard, it seems that international investment agreements are more specific than the
EU founding treaties. This is not so much since international investment agree-
ments, notably BITs, include amore limited number of parties than the EU founding
treaties (ratione personarum).119 The ECT includes a high number of member par-
ties. It is rather a matter of content (ratione materiae), as the EU founding treaties
cover a broader, less detailed subject area than investment agreements.120 Thus, the
Arbitral Tribunal in Eureko held that FET standards under the 1991 Agreement on
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of
the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic èextend beyond the
protections afforded by EU law.æ121 In this context, the MFN clause under ECT
Article 16 becomes a conflict clause and prevails over conflicting TFEU Articles
218(11) and 351 by its nature as lex specialis, addressing energy regulation rather
than economic regulation. Thus, the Vattenfall Tribunal held that èthe Contracting
Parties to the ECT, including the EU, specifically and explicitly agreed that prior
or subsequent treaties that they enter into with each otheræ shall not be interpreted
èso as to derogate from any provision in Part III (äInvestment Promotion and Pro-
tection,’ including substantive protections) or Part V (äDispute Settlement’) ECT,
113. Draft Basic Agreement for the European Energy Charter, Comment 27.18, Aug. 12, 1992, 84
https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/ECT_Drafts/8_-_BA_15__12.08.92_.pdf.
114. Report on Fragmentation, supra note 104, at ¶ 36.
115. Vattenfall, supra note 71, at ¶ 217.
116. Marfin Investment Group Holdings and Others v. Cyprus, ICSID ARB/13/27, at ¶ 595 (2018).
117. Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Protection and EU Law: The Intra- and Extra- EU Dimension
of the Energy Charter Treaty, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L 85, 99 (2012).
118. Report on Fragmentation, supra note 104, at ¶ 65.
119. Christina Binder, A Treaty Law Perspective on Intra-EU BITS, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 964,
973 (2016).
120. Reinisch, supra note 32, at 169-71; Happold & Roe, supra note 112, at 85; Panos Koutrakos, The
Relevance of EU Law for Arbitral Tribunals: (Not) Managing the Lingering Tension, 17 J. WORLD INV.
& TRADE 873, 878 (2016); Klabbers, supra note 72, at 119.
121. Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA
Case No. 2008-13, at ¶ 263.
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where a provision is more favorable to the Investor or Investment.æ122 The Tribunal
added that èthe clearer conflict rule in Article 16 ECT must prevail over a rule de-
rived from an a contrario interpretation of Article 351 TFEUwhich cannot be found
in the text of the TFEU itself.æ123
According to the subsidiary principle of lex posterior, the subsequent source
and ensuing obligations prevail. Under VCLT and VCLTIO Article 30(3), this
principle explicitly applies to subsequent treaties between the same parties covering
the same subject matter è[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also
to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation
under Article 59.æ124 The text of TFEU Article 351 is identical to Article 234 of the
1957 EEC Treaty and is almost identical to the text of Article 307 of the 1992 EC
Treaty. Article 16 of the 1994 ECT can thus be considered lex prior or posterior,
depending on what reference is considered for the EU founding treaties.
In sum, a conflict could be avoided by including a clause within the investment
contract, specifying the law the parties chose to govern the contract.125 Absent such
a clause, conflict of laws rules apply. If a harmonious interpretation is impossible,
in the case of hierarchical equality the principles of specialty and temporality should
apply: 1) Harmonious interpretation, 2) Hierarchy (lex superior), 3) Specialty (lex
specialis), and 4) Inter-temporality (lex posterior). On the basis of these principles,
the ECT should be interpreted harmoniously with EU law. If this proves impossi-
ble, the ECT in principle prevails as lex superior, specialis, and posterior, although




International investment disputes are settled via different mechanisms. For in-
stance, ECT Article 26 establishes adjudication by domestic courts, international
arbitrators, or conciliators.126 It is controversial whether the conflict of supremacy
between the EU founding treaties and international investment agreements con-
cluded by the EU and the Member States has any procedural implications. The
question has been discussed regarding international arbitration, within the context
of the new EU policy aimed at reforming the current ICSID-centered system.127
However, the same issues arise within the framework of other dispute settlement
mechanisms applicable under the conflict of laws rules and concern domestic
122. Vattenfall v. Germany [2018] ICSID ARB/12/12, at ¶ 193, emphasis added.
123. Id. at ¶ 227.
124. VCLT, supra note 13, at 339; United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States
and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Documents of the Conference,
100, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986).
125. Patrick Dumberry, International Investment Contracts, in INT’L INV. L. 215, 220, 223-24 (Tarcisio
Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds.,, 2012).
126. Vives, supra note 89, at 276-77; Puig & Scheffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and
the Reform of Investment Law, 12 AMER. J. INT’L L. 361, 387 (2018).
127. Puig & Scheffer, supra note 126, at 397-399; Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Reform, UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state (last visited Feb.
26, 2021).
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adjudication and the envisaged Permanent Investment Court,128 when EU law is the
law applicable to resolve a dispute.129
The Arbitral Tribunal in Eureko disjoined substance and procedure, thus con-
cluding that the application of EU law rather than investment agreements on sub-
stance does not exclude the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.130 Similarly, the Tri-
bunal in Electrabel affirmed the primacy of EU law over EU and Member States’
investment agreements but established its exclusive jurisdiction over the hierarchi-
cally inferior ECT.131
In a majority of cases, conflicts of laws bring together substantive law and in-
terconnected procedures. This has led EU institutions and Member States to prior-
itize EU dispute settlement mechanisms over other ISDS procedures. Notably, in
Eastern Sugar the European Commission argued that è[t]he primacy of EU law and
its definite interpretation by the European Court of Justiceæ could conflict with èa
legal instance (arbitration) in another jurisdiction arriving at a different conclusion,
even in an international agreement;æ the Commission thus requested the termination
of existing intra-EU investment agreements èin order to avoid any legal problem
with regard to an arbitration procedure.æ132 In Charanne, Spain argued that the
primacy of EU law must be regarded as èincluding in particular the right to resolve
disputes through arbitration.æ133 Accordingly, in Achmea the CJEU held that EU
law overrides Member States’ investment agreements based on considerations of a
jurisdictional nature, prioritizing the CJEU and excluding that arbitral tribunals can
interpret and apply EU law in international investment disputes, as these are not
subject to the preliminary ruling procedure under TFEU Article 267.134 Such argu-
ments aim to preserve the CJEU’s role as the èultimate interpreteræ of the EU as an
autonomous constitutional order, per TEU Article 19.135
The priority of EU dispute settlement mechanisms is not uncontroversial. The
Arbitral Tribunal in Masdar v. Spain sought to limit the scope of application of the
jurisdictional argument developed by the CJEU in Achmea, considering that the
CJEU only addressed intra-EU BITs concluded by EU Member States inter-se, not
extra-EU BITs and investment treaties concluded by the EU.136 However, the ra-
tionale of Achmea can extend to all internal and external investment treaties con-
cluded by the EU and its Member States.
Under both internal and external BITs and MITs, tribunals can potentially in-
terpret and apply EU law, excluding the preliminary ruling procedure under TFEU
128. Gisèle Uwera, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in Future EU Investment-Related Agree-
ments: Is the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order an Obstacle?, 15 L.& PRAC.INT’LCT.&TRIBUNALS 102,
138 (2016).
129. But see Pohl, supra note 91, at 789.
130. Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA
Case No. 2008-13, at ¶¶ 279, 288.
131. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 at ¶¶ 5.37 and 5.38.
132. Eastern Sugar B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic at ¶ 119.
133. Charanne & Construction Investments, SCC V 062/2012 at ¶ 208.
134. Slovak Republic v. Achmea, supra note 50, at ¶¶ 56-59.
135. Markus Burgstaller, Dispute Settlement in EU International Investment Agreements with Third
States: Three Salient Problems, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 551, 564 (2014); Van Rossem, supra note
51, at 66; Uwera, supra note 128, at 110-11, 131.
136. Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID ARB/14/1, Award (16 May
2018), ¶ 680. https://www.italaw.com/cases/6608
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Article 261.137 For example, under Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, a tribu-
nal decides a dispute èin accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the
parties,æ otherwise applying èthe law of the Contracting State party to the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as
may be applicable.æ138 Thus, according to the Achmea principle that internationally
agreed dispute settlement mechanisms are incompatible with EU law if the auton-
omy of EU law is not respected,139 in Opinion 1/17, the CJEU considered valid the
establishment of an ISDS mechanism under Chapter VIII (Investment) of the Com-
prehensive Economic Free Trade Agreement (èCETAæ) concluded between the EU
itself and Canada.140 Specifically, the Court considered that the CETA Tribunal
and Appellate Tribunal can only apply the domestic law of the Parties, including
EU law, as a matter of fact, and according to the interpretation of national courts,
excluding the need for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU. The Court therein prior-
itized EU courts over the CETA Tribunals.141
More substantially, the ICSID Tribunal in UP v. Hungary considered its juris-
diction grounded in the ICSID Convention, a multilateral treaty that is not based on
a national or regional context.142 The argument is based on the observation that no
EU rule provides that obligations under the ICSID Convention are èinconsistent
with EU law,æ or that obligations under the ICSID Convention èhave been termi-
nated or replaced by the accession to the EU.æ143 However, as we have seen,144 sub-
stantive inconsistency between international investment agreements and the EU
founding treaties cannot be excluded, which was confirmed by the Vattenfall Tri-
bunal with regard to adjudication of investment disputes.145 Conversely, it can be
argued that the duties under the ICSID Convention are not overridden by obliga-
tions under the EU founding treaties. Arguably, in the international legal frame-
work, the substantive priority of the EU founding treaties is preliminary to affirming
the jurisdictional priority of the CJEU over other investment dispute settlement
mechanisms. Thus, if international investment agreements are prioritized over the
EU founding treaties, investor-state arbitration should apply or other adjudication
mechanisms determined by the parties or conflict of laws rules, excluding the juris-
diction of the CJEU. In other words, the same logic of integration, hierarchy, spe-
cialty, and inter-temporality that applies to substantive obligations under the EU
founding treaties and international investment agreements also applies to jurisdic-
tional obligations under the same treaties. In fact, nothing limits the application in
time of a supremacy clause such as EC Article 16 or the lex specialis and lex pos-
terior principles.
137. See Gavrilovic v. Croatia, ICSID ARB/12/39, Award (25 July 2018) ¶ 427; Quentin Declève,
Achmea: Consequences on Applicable Law and ISDS Clauses in Extra-EU BITs and Future EU Trade
and Investment Agreements, 4 European Papers 99, at 103 ff. (2019).
https://www.italaw.com/cases/1966
138. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159, in force October 14, 1966, 186.
139. Slovak Republic v. Achmea, C-284/16, at ¶ 57 (Mar. 6, 2018).
140. Opinion 1/17, CJEU, (April 30, 2019).
141. Id. at ¶¶ 131 and 134.
142. UP and CD Holding Internationale v. Hungary, Award, ¶ 253 (October 9, 2018).
https://www.italaw.com/cases/6902
143. Id. at ¶ 259.
144. See supra Sections III, IV.
145. Vattenfall, supra note 71, at ¶ 194.
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The Vattenfall Tribunal addressed the question analytically within the context
of the decision on the Achmea issue. The Tribunal considered that èthe corpus of
EU law derives from treaties that are themselves a part of, and governed by, inter-
national law,æ146 including questions of adjudication.147 Within this framework, the
Tribunal affirmed that ECT Article 26 constitutes èthe primary law applicable to
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.æ148 More specifically, the Tribunal held that èArticle 26
ECT . . . must be read in the context of Article 16 ECT,æ149 whereby èArticle 26
ECT, granting the possibility to pursue arbitration, would be understood as ämore
favorable to the Investor,’ insofar as the EU treaties are interpreted to prohibit that
avenue of dispute resolution.æ150 In other words, èECT Article 16 is lex specialis
as a conflict of laws ruleæ under public international law, it èposes an insurmounta-
ble obstacleæ to the èargument that EU law prevails over the ECTæ and èconfirms
the effectiveness of Article 26 and the Investor’s right to dispute resolution, not-
withstanding any less favorable terms under the EU Treaties.æ151 Thus, ECT Article
16 prevents construing the EU treaties in derogation from an investor’s right to ac-
cess dispute resolution means under ECT Article 26, to the extent that the EU trea-
ties and the ECT cover the same subject matter.152 The Tribunal, therefore, con-
cluded that the EU founding treaties cannot be interpreted to exclude ISDS under
ECT Article 26, which would deprive investors of their right to dispute resolu-
tion.153
Furthermore, the Vattenfall Tribunal underscored an inextricable link between
substance and procedure, because ECT Article 2 aims to create a free flow of in-
vestment in the energy field, which dispute settlement means under ECT Article 26
decisively contribute to establishing.154 Excluding dispute resolution avenues under
ECTArticle 26 would run against the aim of liberalizing investment in energy under
ECT Article 2.155 The Tribunal thus concluded that ECT Article 26 does not estab-
lish a disconnection clause in favor of EU law.156 This analysis is complemented by
considerations on the impossibility of reconciling the construction of ECT Article
26 as a disconnection clause in favor of EU law with VCLT and VCLTIO Article
31(1), whereby a treaty must be interpreted èin good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.æ157
From a temporal perspective, according to the lex posterior principle, the Vat-
tenfall Tribunal considered that ECT Article 26 is law subsequent to TFEU Articles
267 and 344, establishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU. TFEU Article
267 indeed corresponds to 1992 EC Article 234 and 1957 EEC Article 177, with
the only addition of the obligation to proceed without delay in delivering a
146. Id. at ¶ 146.
147. Id. at ¶ 148.
148. Id. at ¶ 169. See also Gloria Alvarez, Redefining the Relationship Between the Energy Charter
Treaty and the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union: From a Normative Conflict to Policy
Tension, 33 ICSID REVIEW 560, 572 (2018).
149. Vattenfall, supra note 71, at ¶ 192.
150. Id. at ¶ 194.
151. Id. at ¶ 229.
152. Id. at ¶ 195.
153. Id. at ¶ 196.
154. Id. at ¶¶ 197-198.
155. Vattenfall, supra note 71, at ¶¶ 198.
156. Id. at ¶ 202.
157. Id. at ¶¶ 166-67.
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preliminary ruling, when the case a quo concerns a person in custody. TFEU Arti-
cle 344 corresponds to EC Article 292 and EEC Article 219.158
The situation would have been different if, as argued by the European Com-
mission in Vattenfall and other cases, particularly in Electrabel,159 the EU Member
States had concluded an agreement carving out the application of dispute settlement
mechanisms under ECT Article 26 inter se and for the EU. The Arbitral Tribunal
in Vattenfall, however, excluded this hypothesis.160 The ICSID Tribunal in Landes-
bank Baden-Württemberg and Others v. Spain recently supported these argu-
ments.161 Interestingly, the Landesbank Tribunal excluded the possibility of carv-
ing out intra-EU ECT relationships from the network of multilateral relationships
established by the ECT.162
B. Enforcement
In Micula and Others v. Romania, a Swedish investor was dispossessed of fi-
nancial support granted by Romania for investment in disfavored regions and sub-
sequently reintegrated into the supporting scheme by an ICSID Arbitral Tribunal
for a breach of the FET standard under Article 7 of a BIT concluded in 2002 be-
tween Romania and Sweden.163 Romania, supported by the European Commission
acting as amicus curiae, prevented recognition and enforcement of the award within
its territory, considering this in breach of State aid rules under EU law, and Micula
brought suit in the ECJ.164 The Court held that EU law could not override a BIT
pre-dating accession of Romania to the Union and allowed enforcement.165 Thus,
conflicts of rules on enforcement must be resolved in light of the principles of har-
monization, hierarchy, lex specialis, and lex posterior, which indeed have no lim-
ited application in time.166
International investment agreements often include supremacy clauses address-
ing enforcement. For instance, ECT Article 26 provides that è[t]he awards of arbi-
tration, which may include an award of interest, shall be final and binding upon the
parties to the disputeæ and è[e]ach Contracting Party shall carry out without delay
any such award and shall make provision for the effective enforcement in its Area
of such awards.æ An implied primacy clause is included in ICSID Convention Ar-
ticle 54, providing that è[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered
. . . as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within
158. Id. at ¶ 218.
159. See supra Section II.
160. Vattenfall, supra note 71, ¶ 188.
161. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and Others v. Spain, ICSID ARB/15/45, Decision on the äIntra-
EU’ Jurisdictional Objection, February 25, 2019, ¶¶ 101, 150, 168-169, and 182-184. See also Spain v.
Novenergia, where the Svea Court of Appeals recently rejected a request for a CJEU preliminary ruling
on the applicability of the ECT in intra-EU investment disputes (Spain v. Novenergia II, Svea Court of
Appeal, T 4658-18, Decision of April 25, 2019).
162. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, at ¶ 148.
163. Micula and Others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, ¶ 827. (Dec. 11, 2013).
164. Micula v. Commission, T-704/15 and T-694/15, Judgment of the General Court (Jun. 18, 2019).
See alsoKoutrakos, supra note 120, at 880; HannoWehland, The Enforcement of Intra-EU BIT Awards:
Micula v. Romania and Beyond, 17 JWIT 942, 944 and 959-961 (2016); Tietje and Wackernagel, supra
note 100, at 235 (positing the supremacy of EU primary law over international investment agreements
in light of TFEU Articles 216(2) and 351).
165. Micula v. Commission, Judgment, at ¶¶ 92 and 100-111. (Jun. 18, 2019).
166. STRIK, supra note 9, at 245.
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its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.æ167 Also, inter-
national agreements governing the enforcement of foreign decisions include su-
premacy clauses. For instance, Article III of the 1958 New York Convention of the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards168 provides that è[e]ach
Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon.æ Article 4 of the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments169 establishes that è[a] judgment given by a court of a Contract-
ing State (State of origin) shall be recognized and enforced in another Contracting
State (requested State).æ170
While the ICSID Convention does not admit exceptions, under Article
(V)(1)(b) of the New York Convention and Article 7(c) of the Hague Convention
exceptions to enforcement are limited to specific circumstances, such as public pol-
icy imperatives. Thus, at the State level, only if it was considered to be against
public policy imperatives, could the enforcement of a foreign judgment or award be
refused, leaving little margin for discretion.171
Scholars have argued that, as the EU is not a party to the ICSID, New York,
and Hague Conventions, primary and secondary EU law could prevent enforce-
ment.172 In the context of commercial arbitration, in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v
Benetton International NV, the ECJ held that EU law also accepts the enforcement
of arbitral awards that are based on an erroneous application of EU law, as long as
such enforcement is not against a èfundamental provision . . . essential for the ac-
complishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community.æ173 According to the Bos-
phorus doctrine,174 given that investors’ protection under international investment
agreements is èequivalentæ to that granted under EU law, only in cases of ègrossæ
violations of EU law, should EU Member States’ courts refuse enforcement of a
foreign judgment or award.175 This is again a dualistic approach, but from the per-
spective of international law, an EU Member State is bound by the ICSID, New
York, and Hague Conventions in the same way it is bound by the EU founding
treaties. So long as the clauses embedded in the former instruments prevail, the EU
founding treaties should be disregarded.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legal order of the EU covers, inter alia, matters of investment liberalization
and protection. This raises problems of consistency for internal and external invest-
ment agreements concluded by the EU and its Member States regarding MFN, NT,
and FET. Such issues have given rise to a variety of disparate opinions, prioritizing
167. Tietje and Wackernagel, supra note 100, at 225.
168. Adopted June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jun. 7, 1959).
169. Adopted July 2, 2019.
170. Hague Conference on Private International Law, opened for signature Feb. 1, 1971, (entered into
force Aug. 20, 1979), https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=78.
171. See STRIK, supra note 9, at 221-223;Wehland, supra note 164, at 953; Pohl, supra note 91, at 784-
785.
172. Tejtie and Wackernagel, supra note 100, at 213.
173. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, C-126/97, ECR I-3055, ¶¶ 35-36 (1999).
174. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim æirketi v. Ireland, Application 45036/98,
Judgment, ¶ 155 (Jun. 30, 2005).
175. Tejtie and Wackernagel, supra note 100, at 244.
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either the EU founding treaties and EU law more generally or international invest-
ment agreements.
Uncertainty concerning the scope of the conflict arises in light of the sources
of EU law as part of international law. Notably, when a harmonious interpretation
under VCLT and VCLTIO Article 31(3)(c) is barred, TFEU Articles 218(11) and
351 can be interpreted as establishing an implicit (a contrario) general priority of
the EU founding treaties over the international agreements of the EU and its Mem-
ber States. This priority is valid from the internal standpoint of the Union, estab-
lishing EU law as lex superior. However, a conflict arises under public international
law between the EU founding treaties and international investment agreements con-
cluded by the EU and its Member States, when the latter includes a primacy clause,
such as ECT Article 16, giving rise to a conflict of supremacies among equal rank-
ing conventions.
Given the impossibility of applying the principle of supremacy (lex superior),
under public international law conflicts between international investment agree-
ments concluded by the EU and its Member States and the EU founding treaties
must be resolved in light of the principles of specialty (lex specialis) and inter-tem-
porality (lex posterior). This requires a case-by-case assessment, but essentially,
even when they are not lex posterior, international investment agreements con-
cluded by the EU and its Member States, such as the ECT, are lex specialis because
the EU founding treaties cover a much more general subject area. A different out-
come is only possible if the parties to a specific investment agreement explicitly
prioritize EU law in an investment contract.
Determining applicable substantive law has critical procedural implications.
The same principles that govern substantive rights apply to dispute settlement and
enforcement. This entails that EU adjudication does not exclude other dispute set-
tlement means, such as ISDS. Furthermore, decisions delivered via extra-EU dis-
pute settlement mechanisms should be enforceable within the EU, save public pol-
icy imperatives.
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